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TIDELANDS AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN FLORIDA
MELVIN J. RICHARD*

The State of Florida 1v virtue of its 1398 miles of coastline,' the longest
of an , state in the Union, has been and will continue to be faced with many
problems concerning ownership and property rights in tidal and submerged
lands within its jurisdictional limits.
This article attempts to cover: First, the applicable rules of law tinder the
common law : the influence of the common law on the law of the United States;
the sovereign character of the thirteen original colonies with respect to tidal
and submerged lands at the tinie of union: rights acquired by states subsequently admitted into the union, and the rights of the United States Government in submerged lands within the jurisdictional limits of the states as well
as tidal and submerged lands bordering upon the states', In order to clarify the
position of the State of Florida, some discussion is made with regard to the
Spanish law which the territory that subsequently became the State of Florida
was subject to prior to its admission into the Union. Second, the decisions of
the State of Florida with respect to the subject matter involved, the common
law and the decisions of other jurisdictions concerning matters upon which
the courts of the State of Florida have not yet ruled. Third, a present existing
example of a cause now pending concerning property bordering upon the
Atlantic Ocean and the City of Miami Beach in which many of the questions of
law reviewed in this article are being tested and will be determined.
I
TirE CoMIMoN

LAW STORY

The rule of law regarding public and private ownership of the shore, both
on navigable and non-navigable waters, is discussed exhaustively in a decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States. The opinion was rendered by Mr.
Justice Horace Gray. 2 In that case it was stated that "by the common law, both
the title and the dominion of the sea, and of the rivers and arms of the sea,
where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all lands below high water mark, within
the jurisdiction of the Crown of England, are in the King. Such waters, and
the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide is in,
* Member of the Florida Bar.
1. World Almanac. p. 102 (1949).

2. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
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are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation and improvement;
and their natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of
navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing by all the King's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privatton, in such lands,
as of waste and unoccupied lands, belongs to the King as the sovereign; and
the dominion thereof jus priblicieo, is vested in him as the representative of the
nation and for the public benefit....
"In England, from the time of Lord Hale, it has been treated as settled that
the title in the soil of the sea, or of arms of the sea, below ordinary high water
mark, is in the King, except so far as an individual or a corporation has acquired rights in it by express grant, or by prescription or usage 3 and that this
title, j ,wprhatuin, whether in the King or in a subject, is held subject to the
public right, jrs puibliczm, of navigation and fishing. 4 The samne law has
been declared by the I-louse of Lords to prevail in Scotland. . .
"By the law of England, also, every building or wharf erected, without
license, below high water mark, where the soil is the King's, is a purpresture,
and may, at the suit of the King, either be demolished, or be seized and rented
for his benefit, if it is not a nuisance to navigation ....
"The English possessions in America were claimed by right of discovery.
Having been discovered by subjects of the King of England, and taken possession of in his name, by his authority or with his assent, they were held by the
King as the representative of and in trust for the nation ; and all vacant lands,
and the exclusive power to grant them, were vested in him. The various charters
granted by different monarchs of the Stuart dynasty for large tracts of territory on the Atlantic coast conveyed to the grantees both the territory described
and the powers of government, including the property and the dominion of
lands under tide waters. And upon the American Revolution all the rights of
the Crown and of the Parliament vested in the several states, subject to the
rights surrendered to the national government by the Constitution of the United
States.' 7
3. Fitzwalter's Case, 3 Keb. 242, 1 Mod. 105 (1672) ; 3 Shep. Abr. 97 (1672) ; Comyn,
Dig. Navigation, A, B; Bac. Abr. Prerogative, B; Rex v. Smith, 2 Dougl. 441 (1780);
Atty. Gen. v. Parmeter, 10 Price 378, 400, 401, 411, 412, 464 (1811) ; Atty. Gen. v. Chambers, 4 DeG. M. & G. 206, 4 DeG. M. & G. 55 (1854) ; Malcomson v. O'Dea, 10 H. L. Cas.
591, 618, 623 (1863) ; Atty. Gen. v. Emerson, App. Cas. 649 (1891).
4. Atty. Gen. v. Parnieter, supra note 3; Atty. Gen. v. Johnson, 2 Wils. 87, 101-103
(1819); Gann v. Free Fishers of Whitstable, 11 H. L. Cas. 192 (1864).
5. Smith v. Stair, 6 Bell, App. Cas. 487 (1849) ; Lord Advocate v. Hamilton, I Macq.
H. L. Cas. 46, 49.
6. Lord Hale, inHargrave's L.aw Tracts, 85; Mitf. Pl. (4th ed.) 145; Blundell v.
Catterall, 5 Barn. & Aid, 268, 298, 305 (1821); Atty. Gen. v. Richards, 2 Anstr. 603, 616
(1794) ; Atty. Gen. v. Parmeter, 10 Price, 378, 411, 464 (1811) ; Atty. Gen. v. Terry, L. R.
9 Ch. 427, 429, note (1873) ; Weber v. State Harbor Corers. 18 Wall. 57 (U.S. 1873);
Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 334, 337 (24:224, 227) (1876).
7. Johnson v. McIntosh. 8 Wheat. 543, 595 (U.S. 1823) ; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet.
367, 408-410, 414 (U.S. 1842) ; Con, v. Roxbury, 9 Gray, 451, 478-481 (Mass. 1857):
Stevens v. Paterson & N.R. Co. 34 N.J. 532, 3 Am. Rep. 269 (1870).
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Mr. Justice Gray, in that same decision, in inaking reference to the rights

of the public in the soil under navigable waters. and the reasons therefor, cited
Chief Justice Taney :8"Indeed, it could not well have been otherwise, for the
men who first formed the English settlements could not have been expected to
encounter the many hardships that unavoidably attended their emigration to
the new world, and to people the banks of its bays and rivers, if the land under
the waters at their very doors was liable to immediate appropriation by another
as private property ; and the settler upon the fast land thereby excluded from
its enjoyment, and unable to take a,shell fish from its bottom, or fasten there
a stake, or even bathe in its waters, without becoming a trespasser upon the
rights of another." 0
Title to the soil under navigable waters, under the common law, except so
far as private rights in such soil had been acquired by express grant or by prescription, was in the sovereign. The rule was applied to the territory of the
United States and to the thirteen original states.' 0
If
THE

UNITED STATES STORY

"The new states admitted into the Union since the adoption of'the Constitution have the same rights as the original states in the tide waters, and in the
lands below the high water mark, within their respective jurisdictions." '1
The term "navigable waters" had a different connotation in England than
in the United States: In England no waters are deemed navigable except those
in which the tide ebbs and flows. In the United States, generally, all waters are
1
deemed navigable which really are navigable. 2
Caution must be taken in applying the rule of law of one state as precedent for cases in another. There is no uniform law on the subject throughout
the United States. The confusion resulting from each state dealing with the
problems involved can readily be observed from an examination of the holdings of the thirteen original states.
"By the old laws of Massachusetts, a littoral proprietor of land owned
down to low water mark, subject, however, to the condition that, until he.occupied the space between high and low water mark the public had a right to
use it for the purposes of navigation." 13 Massachusetts holds that the title to
land adjoining tidal water extends from high water mark to low water mark,
provided the ebb and flow does not exceed one hundred rods. The right thus
8. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 414 (U.S. 1842).
9,See Deering v.Martin, 95 Fla. 224, 116 So. 54 (1928).
10, 6 TnoMPsos ON RFAL PROPFRTY 633 (1924).
11.Shively v,Bowlhy, 152 US. 1 (1893).
12. ibid.
13. Boston v.LeCraw, 17 How. 426. (U.S. 1854).
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created is a property right which can be conveyed by its owner together with
or separate from the upland.' 4 New Hampshire holds title to the shore in

the upland owner.', Rhbode Island gives title to the upland owner only to the
high water mark. However, the upland owner may build structures over the
foreshore provided they do not impede navigation, and provided the legislature
of the state has not specifically prohibited such construction. 6 Connecticut also
vests title below the high water mark in the state. But the upland owner may
wharf out over the f'oreshore provided he does not impede navigation. The
right in the foreshore may be conveyed by the upland owner separate from
the upland .17

New York holds that the upland owner has title only to the high water
mark, that he has no right to wharf out except with legislative authority but
that he does have a right of access to the water.' 8
New Jersey holds the submerged lands, including the foreshore on the
tide waters of the state, to belong absolutely to the state. It further holds that
the state has the power to grant the submerged land and the foreshore to any

one, free from the rights of any riparian owner in them. But a riparian owner
may erect a wharf or dock over the adjoining submerged land. By such improvement he will acquire title to such portion, subject, however, to the state's
right of eminent domain.' 5
Pennsylvania holds that the owner of land abutting upon navigable waters
has title in the soil between high and low water marks, subject to the public
right of navigation and the authority of the legislature to make public in14. Ibid: Mass. Colony Laws (ed. 1660) 50, (ed. 1872) 90, 91; Richardson v. Boston,
19 How. 263 (15:639) (U.S. 1856), and 24 How. 188 (16:625) (U.S. 1860); Com. v.
Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 67-81 (U.S. 1851).
15. Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H. 524, 526 (1845) ; Clement v. Burns, 43 N.H. 609, 621
(1862) ; Concord Mfg. C6. v. Robertson, 66 N.H. 1, 26, 27 (1890).
16. ANGVLL, TIDE WATETtS (2d ed.) 236, 237; Folsom v. Freeborn, 13 R.I. 200 (1881).

17. Ladies' Seamen's Friend Society v. Halstead,. 58 Conn. 144 (1889) ; Prior v.
Swartz, 62 Conn. 132 (1892) ; Walz v. Bennett, 95 Conn. 537, 111 Ad. 834 (1920) ; Orange
v. Resnick, 94 Conn. 573, 109 Atl. 864 (1920) ; Rochester v. Barney, 117 Conn. 462, 169
Atl. 45 (1933).
18. Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend. 9, 21, 21 Am. Dec. 89 (1829) ; Re Staten Island Rapid
Transit Co., 103 N.Y. 251, 8 N.E. 548 (1886) ; People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287; 28
N.Y. 396, 84 Am. Dec. 351 (1863) ; Stevens v. Paterson & N. R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 532, 3 Am.
Rep. 269 (1870) ; Williams v. New York, 105 N.Y. 419, 11 N.E. 829 (1887) ; Kane v. New
York Elev. R. Co., 125 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 278 (1891) ; Rumsey v. New York & New England R. Co., 133 N.Y. 79, 30 N.E. 654 (1892) ; 136 N.Y. 543, 32 N.E. 979 (1883); Hedges v.
West Shore R. Co., 150 N.Y. 150, 44 N.E. 691 (1896) ; Sage v. New York, 154 N.Y. 61,
47 N.E. 1096 (1897) ; People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 218 N.Y. 459, 113 N.E. 521, Ann.
Cas. 1918B, 1099 (1916) ; Jarvis v. Lynch, 157 N.Y. 445, 52 N.E. 657 (1899) ; In re City
of New York, 168 N.Y. 134, 61 N.E. 158 (1901).
19. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. New York & L. B. R. Co., 23 N.J. Eq. 157, 159 (1872);
State v. Yard, 43 N.J.L. 632, 636 (1881) ; American Dock & Imp. Co. v. Trustees for Support of Public Schools, 39 N.J. Eq. 409, 445 (1885) ; Marcus Sayre Co. v. Newark, 60 N.J.
Eq. 361, 45 Atl. 985 (1900); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 10 Am. Dec. 356 (1821);
Stevens v. Patterson & N. R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 532, 3 Am. Rep. 269 (1870) ; New York, L.
E. & W. R. Co. v. Yard, 43 N.J.L. 632 (1881); Philadelphia Brew Co. v. McOwen, 76
N.J.L. 636, 73 AtI. 518 (1909).
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provements upon it, and to regulate his use of it.0 The State of Delaware has
21
Maryland holds that the
declared state ownership of all navigable waters.
owner of land bounded by tide water ay build wharves and other improvenients over the flats in front of his land, and may acquire a right in the land

so improved.

22

The upland owner of lands bounded by tide waters in Virginia has title
to ordinary low water mark. The title to the bed of a navigable river between
low water mark and the line of navigability is in the state, held for the benefit
of its citizens. The riparian owner has the right of access to the water and
23
the right to wharf out.
The State of North Carolina holds that the -state owns the land between
high and low water mark but may make grants of said land. The owners of
the upland, however, have a right to wharf out subject to legislative regula24
tions for the protection of the public rights of navigation and fishing. South
2
Carolina holds title to land under tide waters in the state. C
In Georgia the common law rule is in force except as to the statutory provision to the effect thit the ownership of lands adjacent to navigable streans ex26
tends to low water mark in the bed of the stream.
It should be noted that each of the thirteen original states, with Pennsylvania as the one exception, borders on the Atlantic Ocean.
The recent California Tideland case 27 was given considerable publicity
in the nation's press. There seems to be a popular misconception that the
Supreme Court of the United States, in that case, changed the law of the
land as previously laid down, There can be little drbt lut that it holds contra
to the intimations of all previous holdings of the same court ' and the rules
20. Rundle v. Delaware & R. Canal Co., 14 How. 80 (U.S. 1852) ; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (U.S. 1865) ;Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, lOt Am. Dec.
597 (1869); Wainwright v. McCullough, 63 Pa. 66 (1860) ; Zug v. Com., 70 Pa. 138
(1871) ; Philadelphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. 80, 22 Am. Rep. 738 (1876) ; Wall v,Pittsburgh
Harbor Co., 152 Pa. 427, 34 Am. St. 667 (1893).
21. Bailey v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., 4 Harr. 389 (Del, 1846)), 44 Am Dec. 593

1846) ; Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U.S. 1829).
22. Casey v. Inloes, 1 Gill. 430 (Md. 1844). 39 Am. Dec. 658; Goodsell v. Lawson, 42
Md. 348 (1875) ; Garitee v. Baltimore, 53 Md. 422 (1880) ; Homer v. Pleasants, 66 Md,
475, 7 Ati. 691 (1887) ; Potomac S. B. Co. v. Upper Potomac S. B. Co., 109 U. S. 672
(1883) ; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (U.S. 1855).
23. 5 Ops. Atty. Gen. 412, 435-440; French v. Bankhead, 11 Gratt. 136, 159-161 (Va.
1854) ; Hardy v. McCullough, 23 Gratt. 251. 262 (Va. 1873) ; Norfolk v. Cooke, 27 Gratt.
430, 434, 435 (Va. 1876) ; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875 (1904)
McDonald v. Whitehurst, 47 Fed. 757 (1891).
24. Lewis v. Keeling, 46 N.C. 299, 306, 62 Am. Dec. 168 (1854); Collins v. Benbury,
25 N.C. 277,38 Am. Dec. 722 (1842); 27 N.C. 118,42 Am. Dec. 155 (1844) ; Bond v. Wool,
107 N.C. 139, 12 S.E. 281 (1890) ; Ward v. Willis, 51 N.C. 183, 72 Am. Dec. 570 (1858)

Shepards Point Land Co. v,Atlantic Hotel, 132 N-C. 517, 44 S.E. 39 (1903).
25. State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50 (1884) ; State v- Pinckney, 22 S.C. 484

(1884).
26. GA. CODE §§ 962, 2229, 2230 (1882) ; Howard v. Ingersoll, 13 How. 381, 411, 421
(U.S. 1851) ; Alabama v. Georgia, 23 How. 505 (U.S. 1859) ; Savannah v. State, 4 Ga.

26, 39 (1848) ; Young v.Harrison, 6 Ga. 130, 141 (1849).
27. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1946).
28. Shively v.Bowlby. 152 U.S, 1 (1893).
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laid down by the highest courts of the individual states, but the majority
opinion in that case held that the state-federal conflict arose in this case for the
first time, that the Supreme Court of the United States was never before
called upon to decide and had never before ruled upon the issue involved. The
case was one in which the State of California had entered into oil leases with
persons and corporations authorizing them to enter upon land underlying the
Pacific Ocean extending seaward three nautical miles from ordinary low water
mark of the coast of California to take petroleum, gas and other mineral deposits therefrom. Cali fornia was realizing large sums of money from rents and
royalties being paid by the lessees. This suit by the United States sought to
decree property rights in the described ocean area in the United States as
against the State of California.
Mr. Justice Black, in his opinion for the Court, laid great stress upon
the fact that the position of the State of California was that of a mere property
owner, while the position of the United States was, first, that of a nation clothed
with the "responsibility to exercise whatever power and dominion are necessary
to protect this country against dangers to the security and tranquillity of its
people incident to the fact that the United States is located immediately adjacent to the ocean," and second, as a member of the family of nations,
clothed with the additional responsibility of dealing with other nations. The
decision of the Court made it clear that in the latter capacity the nation would
be burdened and encumbered by state commitments in the event that the state
was held to be the title holder of the lands within the marginal belt. The
Court pointed out the fact that previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court had recognized qualified ownership of lands under inland navigable waters, "and even tidelands down to the low water mark." However,
the Court expressed a reluctance to extend this rule to apply to lands under
the ocean.
The decision makes it clear that it is the opinion of the Court that the
thirteen original colonies, in their sovereign capacity, did retain title to the
tidelands and submerged lands to waters within their territorial jurisdictions
but that those jurisdictional limits did not include the waters in the marginal
belt bordering upon the states.
In his strong dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter points out that
title in the United States was not actually established in the decision of the
Court "except by sliding from absence of ownership by California to ownership by the United States." In that same dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter makes the further point that if, as a matter of fact, the title to the disputed land is not in the State of California, the land is if anything unclaimed
land and the appropriate questions of policy under those circumstances are
"for the determination of which Congress and not this Court is the appropriate
agency."
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In the majority opinion Mr. justice Black unequivocally stated: "Now
that the question is here, we decide for the reasons we have stated that California is not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast, and that
the Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to which is frill dominion over the resources of the
soil under that water area, including oil."
The California Tideland decision did not change the rule that states own the
tideland and soil under navigable waters so far as inland waters are concerned.
Nor did it change the established law to the effect that the foreshore on all
navigable waters, whether inland or not, is the property of the state.
There will probably be additional litigation to determine the rights of the
United States in tidelands under the ocean bordering upon the other states in
the nation.
In a well written article in the Yale Lm, Joirnal2" discussing claims of
title in submerged lands of the continental shel f, it was intimated that the right
to withdraw minerals and other valuable resources from under the bottom of
the sea might give rise to conflicting national claims and questions of each
nation's territorial limits in the adjoining waters of the sea.
Several recent decisions of the Supreme Court have indicated that the
decision in the California Tideland case will not be construed to mean that the
state bordering upon the adjacent ocean area will be completely barred from
jurisdictional corttrol over ocean waters. In one such case,3 0 involving a South
Carolina statute regulating commercial shrimp fishing in the marginal belt area
along the South Carolina coast, certain Georgia citizens brought suit challenging
the constitutionality of the South Carolina statute. Although the statute was
held unconstitutional on grounds other than the jurisdictional right of control of
the State of South Carolina over the coastal waters, the decision is significant
in that the Court held that the State of South Carolina did have power, in the
absence of conflicting federal claim, to regulate fishing in the marginal sea.
The Court, in that case, stated: "In the court below, United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19 (1947), was relied upon for this proposition. Here appellants
seem to concede, and correctly so, that such is neither the holding nor the implication of that case; for in deciding that the U. S., where it asserted its claim,
had paramount rights in the three-mile belt, the Court pointedly quoted and supplied emphasis to a statement in Skeriotes v. Florida,313 U.S. 69, 75 (1941),
that, 'It is also clear that Florida has an interest in the proper maintenance of
the sponge fishery and that the (state) statute so far as applied to conduct within the territorial waters of Florida, in the absence of conflicting federal legislation. is within the police power of the state.'
"Since the present case evinces no conflict between South Carolina's
29. Comment, 56 YALE L. J. 356 (1947).
30. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 393 (1948).
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regulitory scheme and any assertion of federal power, the district court properly concluded that the state has sufficient interests in the shrimp fishery within
three miles of its coast so that it may exercise its police power to protect and

regulate that fishing."
In another case 31 the Court seemed to draw a distinction between ownership of the tide waters themselves and fish within them as distinguished from
the tidelands and resources below them, as was ruled upon in the California
Tideland case. This case was one in which the constitutionality of a California
statute, excluding aliens from pursuing commercial fishing in the marginal
waters, was tested. The Court recognized the previously established doctrine to
the effect that the citizens of the state collectively owned the tide waters "and
the fish in them, so far as they are capable of ownership while running." The
Court, in effect, held, that the nature of the ownership in the State of California
was not sufficiently adequate to justify the said state from excluding "any or
all aliens who are lawful residents of the state from making a living by fishing
in the ocean off its shores while permitting all others to do so."
III
THE FLORIDA STORY

The country known as Florida prior to 1783, during British occupancy,
was divided into East and West Florida, with the Chattahoochee and Apalachicola rivers as the eastern boundaries of West Florida. After Florida reverted to
Spain under the Treaty of Paris of 1783, the designations of East and West
Florida were retained. However, the northern boundary of West Florida eventually became the line of thirty-one degrees north latitude and the western boundary was located at the Perdido River. Between 1783 and 1821 the provinces of
East and West Florida were subject to Spanish dominion. Although the country was largely inhabited by Indians during that period, they could grant lands
only pursuant to the Spanish laws by and with the consent of the proper Spanish authorities.
The law of Spain at that time provided that grants could not be made of
tidal and submerged lands except by the king or by express authority of the
king.3 2 Under the civil law of Spain those owing allegiance to the crown were
equally entitled to the right to fish in the public waters of the kingdom. The
common law, like the civil law of Spain, held that the waters of the sea and the
shores thereof are subject to public use. However, the essential difference rests
31. Torao Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 420 (1948); see Note, 3
MIAmI LQ. 50 (1948).

32. Apalachicola Land & Development Co. v. McRae, Commissioner of Agriculture,
86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923) ; Ex parte Powell, 70 Fla. 363, 70 So. 392 (1915) ; State v.
Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908) ; State v. City of Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 102 So. 336
(1924) ; Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co., 108 Fla. 46, 146 So. 249 (1933).
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in the civil law doctrine that such waters are the property of no one. The policy
of the common law, on the contrary, was to assign everything capable of occupancy and susceptible of ownership to a legal and certain proprietor. The
latter theory of ownership makes those things which from their nature cannot be
exclusively occupied and enjoyed, the property of the sovereign. Hence, upon
the cession of the territory now constituting the State of Florida the land and
the people living within the territory became subject to the laws of the United
States, and the cession involved no reservation to persons collectively or severally of fishing rights in the public waters.33
By treaty with Spain there was ceded to the United States all territories
34
then belonging to Spain, known by the name East and West Florida.
"The original 13 states, that formed the federal Union as the United
States of America, were distinct and independent sovereignties, and as such
severally owned and held in trust for the whole people within their respective
borders the navigable waters in the states and the lands thereunder, including
the shore or land between high and low water marks. Proprietary rights in
the lands of this character within the states were not passed to the United States
by the federal Constitution, under which the Union was founded, and no power
to dispose of such lands was delegated to the United States. Therefore all proprietary rights in and power to dispose of lands under navigable waters in the
states, including the shore between high and low water marks, were reserved
to the states severally or to the people thereof....
"The navigable waters in the states and the lands under such waters, including the shore or lands between ordinary high and low water marks, are the
property of the states, or of the people of the states in their united or sovereign
capacity. They are held, not for the purposes of sale or conversion into other
values, or reduction into several or individual ownership, but for the use of all
the people of the states, respectively, for purposes of navigation, commerce,
fishing, and other-useful purposes afforded by the waters in common to and for
the people of the states. The title to the lands of this character was withheld by
the original states of this Union as essential to the sovereignty of the states, to
the welfare of the people of the states, and to the proper exercise of the police
powers of the states. A state may make limited disposition of portions of such
lands, or of the use thereof, in the interest of the public welfare, where the
rights of the whole people of the state as to navigation and other uses of the
waters are not materially impaired. The states cannot abdicate general control
over such lands and the waters thereon, since such abdication would be incon33. Ex parte Powell, supra note 32.
34. Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits between the United States of America and
His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, concluded February 22, 1819, ratifications exchanged at Washington, D.C., U.S.A., February 22, 1821, proclaimed February 22, 1821;
Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919); Apalachicola Land & Development
Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923) ; State v. City of Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 102 So.
336 (1924).
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sistent with the implied legal duty of the states to preserve and control such
lands and the waters thereon and the use of them for the public good." '"
In order to understand and appreciate the nature of the right and title
acquired by the State of Florida from the United States, certain terms should be
clearly defined. "Uplands" are lands bordering on bodies of water. These lands,
above the high water mark, are subject to private ownership. 86 The "foreshore"
is that land bordering upon navigable waters between the ordinary high water
mark and the ordinary low water mark.37 These lands which are covered and
uncovered by the ordinary daily tides of public navigable waters are also known
as shore or tidelands.38 Overflowed lands, as distinguished from tidelands, are
those that are covered by non navigable waters. Swamp lands, as distinguished
from overflowed lands, are such as require drainage to dispose of needless
water or moisture on or in the lands, in order to make them fit for successful
and useful cultivation.39
Subsequent to the acquisition by the United States of the territory known
as East and West Florida, the lands under navigable waters, including the
shores, were held by the United States for the use and benefit of all the people,
eventually to go to the future State of Florida for the use and benefit of the
whole people of the said state.40
Under Act of Congress 41 the territory of Florida was admitted "into
the Union on equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatsoever."
The Act of Congress admitting Florida into the Union of States specifically
provided that the new State "never interfere with the primary disposal of the
public lands lying within them."
The Supreme Court of Florida made it clear that the restriction in the act
of admission referring to "the primary disposal of the public lands lying within"the state of Florida "has reference to lands within the territorial limits of
the state, the title to which was in the United States for its own purposes, as
distinguished from lands held in trust for the people, such as lands under navigable waters, including the shore between high and low water marks, which
passed to the sovereign state, to be held by it in trust for the people thereof." 42
Therefore, at the time of the admission of Florida into the Union. the
35. State v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908) ; Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal
Co., 108 Fla. 46, 146 So. 249 (1933).
36. Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927).
37. Thiesen v. Gulf, F. &. A. Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1917).
38. State v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908) ; Apalachicola Land & Development Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923); Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82
So. 221 (1919) ; Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1917) ; Miller
v. Bay-To-Gulf Inc., 141 Fla. 452. 193 So. 425 (1940).
39. State v. Gerbing, supra note 38; Brickell v. Trammell, supra note 38; Thiesen v.
Gulf, supra note 38; Miller v. Bay-To-Gulf Inc., supra note 38.
40. State v. Gerbing, supra note 38; Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co., supra note
35; Brickell v. Trammell, supra note 38: Apalachicola Land & Development Co. v. McRae,
mipra note 38.
41. 5 STAT. 742 (1845).
42. State v. Gerbing; 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908).
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state became vested with and assumed title to the tidelands and lands covered by
all navigable waters in the state, which lands are called sovereignty lands as distinguished from ordinary public lands. The latter are subject to sale and are subject to private ownership in fee simple absolute. The sovereignty lands have
43
limitations of tenure and uses for public purposes.
We will not dwell upon nor attempt to develop the law as applied to submerged land under non navigable waters but, in passing, it might be noted that
the swamp and overflowed lands within the State of Florida were granted to
the state by act of Congress approved September 28, 1850. 4 4 Non navigable
45
waters may be the subject of private ownership.
It is settled law within the State of Florida that the state, having acquired
title to the lands over navigable waters, and the foreshore thereof, by virtue of
its sovereignty, such title is held by the state in trust for the use and benefit of
all of the people of the State of Florida for purposes of navigation, commerce,
fishing, bathing, as well aS other useful purposes afforded by the waters; that
such title is not held by the state for purposes of sale or conversion into other
values, or for reduction into several or individual ownership."1 However, the
state is not completely barred from making grants of rights therein. The state
may, in the public interest, grant rights in such lands within the state, or may
permit the use thereof by individuals provided the rights of all people in the
State of Florida as to navigation, commerce, bathing and other useful purposes
which the waters afford, are not materially impaired. The state in making such
limited grants must abide by the principle laid down that the rights of the people
of the state in the navigable waters and the lands thereunder, as well as the f oreshore, are principally designed for the public welfare. In effecting such grants
the state cannot be relieved of control and regulation of the uses afforded by
4T
the said lands and the waters thereon.
The trust doctrine to the effect that the state holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters in trust for the people of the state was held not to bar
the state from granting legal title to submerged lands in Biscayne Bay in the
case of Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co.4 8 There it was demonstrated
that the deed conveyed the legal title, subject to the state's police power and
to the paramount power of Congress over navigable waters.
By statute the trustees of the internal improvement fund are vested with

43. State v. City of Tampa, 88 Fla. 196, 102 So. 336 (1924).
44. See note 42 supra.
45. Miller v. State, 75 Fla. 136, 77 So. 669 (1918).
46. State v. Rosenthal, 109 Fla. 363, 148 So. 769 (1933).
47. Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee, 62 Fla. 549, 57 So. 428 (1912) ; Martin v. Busch,
93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927) ; Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919) ;
Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1917) ; Pembroke v. Peninsular
Terminal Co., 108 Fla. 46, 146 So. 249 (1933) ; Hicks v. State, 116 Fla. 603, 156 So. 603
(1934) ; Perky Properties Inc. v. Felton, 113 Fla. 432, 151 So. 892 (1934).
48. 108 Fla. 46, 146 So. 249 (1933).
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the administration and control of tidal lands.4 9 As has heretofore been shown r"
grants could be made in the public interest under certain conditions. 5' But conveyances made by the trustees of the internal improvement fund of sovereignty lands, as distinguished from other public lands, either by mistake or other5
wise are ineffectual for lack of authority from the state.

2

It is well established law in this state that, with few exceptions, private
ownership of lands bordering on navigable waters extends only to the high
water mark.53 Persons claiming private ownership in such property below the
high water mark have the burden of establishing adequate proof of the source
4
of their title, presumption being that title thereto is in the state.5
As has been shown, the property rights of a riparian owner of land on
navigable waters are determined and established by the decisions of the state
within whose boundary the particular land lies. 5 The riparian rights of land
bordering on navigable waters in this state include the right of ingress and
egress in the riparian owner over the foreshore to and from his property and
the adjoining waters. In addition, the riparian owner has the right to an unobstructed view over the waters from his property. In common with the public
he enjoys the right of navigation, bathing and fishing in such waters as well as
the use of the foreshore. 58 Title to the foreshore, as against the State of Florida,
cannot be acquired by prescription. Inasmuch as the title is held by the state in
trust for the use and benefit of the public, the statute of limitations does not
run. Title cannot be acquired by adverse possession against the public. 51 In
49. FLA. STAT. § 253.03 (1941) : "The trustees of the internal improvement fund of
the State of Florida are vested and charged with the administration, management, control,
supervision, conservation and protection of all land and products on, under, or growing out
of, or connected with, lands owned by, or which may hereafter inure to, the State of Florida,
not vested in some other state agency. Such lands shall be deemed to be:
All swamp and overflowed lands held by the State of Florida, or which may hereafter
inure to said state.
All lands owned by the state by right of its sovereignty.
All internal improvement lands proper.
All tidal lands.
All lands covered by shallow waters of the ocean, gulf, or bays or lagoons thereof, and

all lands owned by the state covered by fresh water.
All parks, reservations, or lands or bottoms set aside in the name of the state not under
the supervision and control of some other agency of said state, or of the United States, or
other governmental agency.
All lands which have accrued, or which may hereafter accrue, to the state from any
source whatsoever, unless or until vested in some other state agency."

50. See note 47 supra.
51. State v.Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908) ; Deering v. Martin, 95 Fla. 224,
116 So. 54 (1928).

52. Martin v.Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927).

53. Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A.Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1917) ;Brickell v.TrammelI, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919) ; Adams v.Elliott, 128 Fla. 79, 174 So. 731 (1937)
Martin v.Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927).
54. Apalachicola Land & Development Co.v.McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923)
Brickell v.Trammell, supra note 53; Williams v. Guthrie, 102 Fla. 1047, 137 So. 682
(1931) ;Martin v.Busch, supra note 53.
55. Thiesen v.Gulf, F.& A.Ry.Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1917).
56. Thiesen v.Gulf, supra note 55; White v.Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 190 So. 446 (1939).
57. Thiesen v. Gulf, supra note 55; Brickell v.Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221
(1919).
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the case of Freed v. Miami Beach Pier Corporatio, 551although it was held that
the right of the plaintiff to enjoin the invasion of certain of his riparian rights,
particularly the right to an unobstructed view of the waters, had been lost by
laches, the sovereign rights of the state or the powers of Congress were not affected by the adjudication between the parties. It is curious to note that the
court in this case did not attempt to determine or adjudicate the rights of the
state in the property involved. It may be that the court made no such determination or adjudication because no question of title to submerged or tidal lands was
asserted or claimed in this cause of action, the cause being one seeking an injunction. In a later case,1: in which private parties were asserting title to submerged lands in Sarasota Bay, the court held that "when it appears that the
rights of the state in lands sued for are involved, and the state is not a party before the court, it is the duty of the courts to take notice of the rights of the
state and make appropriate orders to preserve such rights from impairment,
even though none of the parties to the cause raise such questions, nor make any
objections with respect to the state's rights involved."
The right of the upland owner to pursue construction of docks, wharfs,
piers or other improvements over the foreshore and over the submerged lands
is one of obvious importance both to the upland owner as well as to the public.
By legislative enactment,( 6 the state divested itself of title to submerged lands
and vested full title therein to the riparian proprietors. It is significant to note
that the state, in divesting itself of such title, did so "subject to any inalienable
trust under which the state holds all submerged lands and water privileges within its boundaries," and vested such title in the riparian proprietors "subject to
said trust." The act itself dates back to 1856. It was not until the Act of 1921
that the reference to the "inalienable trust under which the state holds said
58. 93 Fla. 888, 112 So. 841 (1927).
59. Williams v. Guthrie, 102 Fla. 1047, 137 So. 682 (1931).
60. FLA. STAT. § 271.01 (1941) :"The State of Florida, subject to any inalienable trust
under which the state holds all submerged lands and water privileges within its boundaries,
divests itself of all right, title and interest to all lands covered by water lying in front of
any tract of land owned by the United States or by any person, natural or artificial, or by
any municipality, county or governmental corporation under the laws of Florida, lying
upon any navigable stream or bay of the sea or harbor, as far as to the edge of the channel;
and vests the full title to the same, subject to said trust in and to the riparian proprietors,
giving them the full right and privilege to build wharves into streams or waters of the bay
or harbor as far as may be necessary to affect the purposes described, and to fill up from the
shore, bank or beach as far as may be desired, not obstructing the channel, but leaving full
space for the requirements of commerce, and upon lands so filled in to erect warehouses,
dwellings or other buildings and also the right to prevent encroachments of any other person upon all such submerged land in the direction of their lines continued to the channel
by bill in chancery or at law, and to have and maintain action of trespass in any court of
competent jurisdiction in the state, for any interference with such property, also confirming to the riparian proprietors all improvements which may have heretofore been made
upon submerged lands; provided, that the grant herein made shall apply to and affect only
those submerged lands which have been, or may be hereafter, actually bulkheaded, filled in,
or permanently improved, continuously, from high water mark in the direction of the
channel, or as near in the direction of the channel as practicable to equitably distribute the
submerged lands, and shall in no wise affect such submerged lands until actually filled in or
permanently improved."
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lands" was incorporated into the act. e" However, even without the qualification
with respect to the trust doctrine, there can be little doubt but that the title of
any riparian owner would be subject to the trust in which the state holds such
property as well as subject to the paramount power of Congress over navigable
waters. The act specifically provides that nothing therein "shall be construed tc
prohibit any person from boating, bathing or fishing in water covering the submerged lands of this state or from exercising any of the privileges heretofore
allowed by law as to such submerged land and water covering the same, until
such submerged lands shall be filled in or improved by the riparian owner as
herein authorized." 62 In the case of Holland v. Ft. Pierce Financing& Const.
Co.63 it was held that tinder the subject statute the title which vested in the
riparian owner was a qualified one which became absolute when and if the upland owner bulkheaded and filled in from the shore. The decision of the court
indicates that the trust doctrine was in no way altered by the statute, that the
grant of sovereignty land must not substantially impair the interest of the public in the remaining lands and waters and that the bulkheading and filling in toward the channel must leave ample space for purposes of navigation and commerce. The case was one involving property on the Indian River. The court did
unequivocally state: "The incidental use by the public of the foreshore and adjacent waters of a navigable stream such as the one here under consideration
must yield to the paramount proprietary right of the riparian owner, when and
if he constructs the improvements specified in the Act, and within the limitations
prescribed." The construction in this case, of course, is based upon legislative
authority. In the light of subsequent discussion herein, it should be observed
that so far as the public is concerned the primary uses of the waters here involved were navigation and commerce. It has consistently been held in this
state that a riparian proprietor whose lands extend to navigable waters has no
right to build out over the foreshore and upon the submerged lands except with
express authority and consent of the state. Such construction, pursued without
proper consent of the state, has been held to be purprestures in law or nuisances
if the construction amounts to a damage to the port or navigation. 4 In Williams
v. Guthrie, 5 it was held that construction lipon tidelands without proper
authority was deemed an encroachment upon the property of the sovereign, a
purpresture which the sovereign may remove at pleasure, whether it tends to obstruct navigation or otherwise. The riparian act referred to specifically excepts
61. Holland v. Ft. Pierce Financing & Const. Co., 157 Fla. 649, 27 So.2d 76 (1946).
62. FLA. STAT. § 271.08 (1941) :"Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit
any person from boating, bathing or fishing in water covering the submerged lands of
this state or from exercising any of the privileges heretofore allowed by law as to such submerged land and water covering the same, until such submerged lands shall be filled in or
improved by the riparian owner as herein authorized."

63. 157 Fla. 649, 27 So.2d 76 (1946).
64. Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1917) ;Freed v. Miami

Beach Pier Corporation, 93 Fla. 888, 112 So. 841 (1927).
65. 102 Fla. 1047, 137 So. 682 (1931).

TIDELANDS AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN FLORIDA

353

66
beaches customarily used by the public as bathing beaches. The Supreme
Court of Florida, on this subject, stated: "The Riparian Acts of 1856 (Laws
1856, c. 791) and 1921 (Laws 1921, c. 8537) are applicable only to 'any navigable stream or bay of the sea or harbor.' The locus in quo here is on the ocean

front." 67

Riparian rights, whether they include the right to wharf out or bulkhead
and fill below the upland or not, are property rights. As such they cannot be
taken from the upland owner for public use without just compensation. 66
It has been observed herein that the legislature and the courts have set up
certain distinctions with regard to the applicable rules of law for non navigable
waters as compared with navigable waters and with regard to navigable inland
waters as compared with the ocean front. Considerably greater freedom and
leeway in asserting title and erecting improvements has been given the riparian
owner on non navigable waters than upon navigable waters, and considerably
more freedom and leeway has been given the riparian owner on inland navigable
waters as compared with those on the ocean front.
The primary use of the ocean front beaches has been established for the
purposes of bathing, recreation, fishing and navigation. The incursion or curtailment of any of these uses on the ocean front has largely been frowned
upon by the Florida courts. However, the ocean front has not been wholly restricted to those primary uses. By legislative enactment some of the ocean front
beaches have been established as public highways. 6 It has been made clear,
however, that the use of the foreshore or beach on the ocean which is held by
the sovereign in trust for the public, for purposes other than the primary uses, is
subject to the paramount right of the public to use those beaches for bathing and
recreation. 70 The right of the public to use the beach for bathing and recreational purposes has been held to be superior to that of motorists driving automobiles
7t
on authorized highways on such beaches.
Waterfront properties pose unique problemus not common to other lands.
The waters often perform in strange fashion, sometimes creating new'land,
sometimes causing ail increment to the adjoining property and sometimes causing losses of land to the adjoining property.
Accretion is the.term commonly employed to denote the action of the
waters in depositing material so as gradually to cause an increase in the riparian
land. This waterborne sand or other material which forms the deposit and
creates additional dry land which was previously covered by water is re66. FLA. STAT. § 271.07 (1941): "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply
to beaches customarily used by the public as bathing beaches."

67. Freed v. Miami Beach Pier Corporation, 93 Fla. 888, 112 So. 841 (1927).
68. Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1917).
69. White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 190 So. 446 (1939) ; Adams v. Elliott, 128 Fla. 79.
174 So. 731 (1937).
70. Adams v. Elliott, supra note 69.
71. White v. Hughes, supra note 69.
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ferred to as "alluvion." Hence, the ;lccretion is the act of depositing and the
alluvion the deposit itself. 2 At times, instead of the water building up the shore
by making deposits which gradually displace the water, the water itself recedes,
leaving dry land where the water previously was. Additional land created in
this manner is generally referred to as reliction or dereliction. 3 A loss or addition to land occasionally occurs by a sudden and perceptible natural reaction
of the water. Such a sudden loss or addition is referred to as "avulsion." 74 The
constant action of the water will sometimes wash away the land if artificial
means of some character are not employed to prevent such loss. Such gradual
loss of land is termed "erosion." 75 It can be stated as a general rule of law that
where a gradual and imperceptible change occurs on riparian land by virtue of
accretion, reliction or erosion, the land as so changed remains the boundary line
of the upland owner. Thus the riparian owner, under such circumstances, would
acquire title to all additional land so acquired and would suffer the loss of title
to such portions of the land as may be encroached upon or washed away by the
water. This rule of law, however, does not generally apply where the change
takes place suddenly and perceptibly as by reliction or avulsion. 76 The accretion is generally deemed to be imperceptible if it is so gradual that the process
itself cannot be perceived by witnesses. The fact that it subsequently becomes
obvious that there has been an accretion does not prevent it from being imper77
ceptible.
The Supreme Court of Florida recognized the doctrine of accretion and
reliction and the rights of the riparian owner as described herein. The court
stated: "At common law, all navigable waters and the lands thereunder were
held by the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people, and the owner of
land abutting on navigable waters had no exclusive right in the waters, below
ordinary highwater mark or in the lands under the waters, except the right of
access to and from the navigable waters, and rights in the land growing out
of accretion or reliction." 78
A different rule is generally applied where the change in the land due to
the action of the water takes place as a result of artificial conditions which are
created by third persons, by the state, or even by the upland owner himself.

Where the riparian owner deliberately creates the accretion by means of artificial structures, it is generally held that he cannot claim title to the land added

in that manner. However, many authorities hold that the upland owner may
acquire title to the land so added by some artificial obstruction where the arti72. See 56 Am.Jur. § 476.

73. See 56 Am.Jur. § 476.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See 56 Am.Jur. § 476.
See 56 Am.jur. § 476.
See 56 An.Jur. § 477.
See 56 Am.Jur. § 484.
Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee, 62 Fl.. 549, 57 So. 428 (1912).
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ficial condition is created or erected by third persons and where the upland
owner had no part in that activity.7 9
The Supreme Court of Florida, in considering the question of title to
property created by reliction, stated: "If to serve a public purpose, the state,
with the consent of the federal authority, lowers the level of navigable waters
so as to make the water recede and uncover lands below the original high-water
mark, the lands so uncovered below such high-water mark, continue to belong
to the state. Reliction is the term applied to land that has been covered by water,
but which has become uncovered by the imperceptible recession of the water.
"The doctrine of reliction is applicable where from natural causes water
recedes by imperceptible degrees, and does not apply where land is reclaimed
by, governmental agencies as by drainage operations." so
The rule of law concerning title to land created by imperceptible accretion
was well stated by the United States Supreme Court as follows:
"The rule, everywhere admitted, that where the land encroaches upon the
water by gradual and imperceptible degrees, the accretion or alluvion belongs to
the owner of the land, is equally applicable to lands bounding on tide waters or
on fresh waters, and to the King or the state as to private persons; and is independent of the law governing the title in-the soil covered by the water." "I
In view of the development of the law as set out in the California Tideland
case, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Florida, in a recent
case,8 2 reported prior to the decision in the California Tideland case, held that
the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund did have authority, under certain legislative enactmehts, to execute oil leases on sovereign lands of the state
located in tidal waters. However, it appears from the reported decision that
no question was raised with regard to ocean waters. The case does not reveal any
particular properties involved. Under the circumstances, it can be assumed that
in the event the question subsequently arises, the Florida court can decide that
the words "sovereign lands of the state located in tidal waters" do not include
the ocean bottom. It is presumed, of course, that the court might arrive at such
a finding only if the Florida court construes the California Tideland decision to
apply, so far as title in the United States is concerned, to Florida's marginal
belt in the same manner as it was applied to California's marginal belt.
IV
THE MIAMI BEACH STORY

The writer has singled out Miami Beach first, because of the physical aspects of the ocean front, second, because it represents an illustration of what
79.
80.
81.
82.

See Note, 134 A.L.R. 467 (1941).
Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927).
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
Watson v. Holland, 155 Fla. 342, 20 So.2d 388 (1944).
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appears to be encroachments upon the sovereign land both of the state and the
federal governments, and third, because a suit is now pending in the Circuit
Court in and for Dade County, Florida. 3 This suit, in effect, seeks to enjoin,
as a nuisance, purported encroachments upon the foreshore and upon the ocean
bottom. The upland property in the disputed area is composed of hotel sites.
As will be shown, the upland hotel owners have improved their property seaward in such fashion that the construction has encroached upon and over the
tidelands and the submerged lands of the Atlantic Ocean.
In order to clarify the picture effectively, it is necessary to define two terms
which will be employed, to-wit: "groyne" and "bulkhead."
A groyne is a steel wall projected into the ocean, perpendicular to the
shore, for a distance of approximately two to three hundred feet. Primarily, it
is employed as a means of protecting the beach from being washed away. It
also performs the important function of trapping waterborne sand, thus causing artificial accretion, adding to and building up the beach.
A bulkhead is also a wall but it extends on a horizontal line with the sea.
It separates the sea from the mainland and endeavors to protect the landward
property from the force of the sea. On the ocean at Miami Beach these bulkheads are built of steel sections and, when completed, stand about eight feet
high. As the groynes trap the sand, the beach builds up. The bulkheads gradually diminish in height as the sand accumulated by accretion packs into a
gentle slope leading from the bulkhead to the sea. The foregoing description is,
of course, conditioned upon accretion.
In a paper prepared by Morris N. Lipp, City Engineer for the City of
Miami Beach, Florida, it was stated: "The function of a groyne is to reclaim
and stabilize beaches and that of the bulkhead to establish a final barrier against
the encroachment of the ocean."
Surveys and plats are available s4 which show the ordinary high water
mark and the ordinary low water mark over the years on the ocean front in
the City of Miami Beach. The records indicate that there were periods of
time when the upland owners enjoyed imperceptible accretions and that there
were other times when they suffered imperceptible erosion. The records further
indicate that in or about the year 1927, at the instance of the City Council of
the City of Miami Beach, the Engineering Department of the City established
a bulkhead line along the high water mark on the ocean front in the city. Inasmuch as the line was a meandering line, for the sake of uniformity, a
straight line was established which, in most instances, gave the upland owner
the benefit of every doubt. Along this line, during 1927 and 1928, bulkheads
were erected and filled on the landward side thereof. It may eventually prove
significant that the City of Miami Beach, at its own expense, with no assess83. State of Florida, ex rel. Harry Plissner v. Harry Simberg, No. 122167-D.
84. City Engineer's Office, City of Miami Beach, City Hall. Miami Beach, Florida.
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ments against the abutting property owners, also installed a series of groynes
so that additional beach area might possibly accrue over the years. The records
indicate that the money which was used by the city for this purpose was paid
out of proceeds of a bond issue floated in 1926 for parks and docks.
These bulkheads and groynes represented the first large scale construction to preserve and create beach artificially.
In appraising the application of the law in this section of this article so
far as the City of Miami Beach is concerned, the reader should bear in mind
that the application is being made on the presumption that the facts:as set
forth herein are correct. It is not intended to intimate that the facts are not
correct but merely to make it clear that a cause of action hereinabove referred
to, now pending in the Circuit Court, has not progressed sufficiently to have established these facts as the facts of the case.
The established law has been shown herein to be first, that where a
gradual and imperceptible change occurs on riparian land by virtue of accretion,
reliction or erosion, the land so changed remains the boundary line of the up.
land owner s1 and that the title to the land so changed does not vest in the
riparian owner where the change has been artificially induced. Therefore, it
seems that:
85. See note 76 supra.
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The 1928 bulkhead line seaward of an unimproved hotel site on the ocean at
Miami Beach.
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The same 1928 bulkhead line with property landward of line, improved with
a hotel.

II I
Courtesy,' Mla2ll

[I

Id

The 1948 bulkhead line extended about 75 feet seaward of the 1928 line, filled
and improved with swimming pool, cabanas and dining terrace.
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First: The 1927 bulkhead line, being the high water mark of that date,
was the line where private property ended, that public property extended east
thereof.
Second: Accretion of the beach east of the said 1927 bulkhead line to the
low water mark is the property of the State of Florida.
The City Council of the City of Miami Beach passed a series of ordinances
which, in effect, authorized the owners of property abutting the ocean, within
the City of Miami Beach, to extend their existing bulkhead lines a distance
seaward of approximately seventy-five feet. The riparian owners were further
authorized, by ordinances, to fill the area landward of the newly erected bulkheads. The upland owners were also granted the right, by ordinances, to improve the extended area with private swimming pools, cabanas and dining terraces. It should be noted that the bulkheads which were authorized by the
said ordinances, some of which have been constructed and are the subject of
the aforesaid pending litigation, are built of steel sections and when completed
stand about eight feet high. In practically every instance along the ocean fiont
where these extensions have been installed seaward of the old bulkhead line,
the new bulkheads extend over the tidal land of the foreshore, beyond the
present ordinary high water mark and, in many instances, extend beyond the
present ordinary low water mark. Hence, the extended bulkhead construction
effectively bars the public and serves to establish an exclusive beach for the
guests of the hotels on the abutting upland property. To clarify the picture
it should be understood that these bulkheads actually constitute an open steel
box, eight feet high, filled with sand. Mere physical observation makes it apparent that many of the new bulkheads stand in deep water even at low tide
and that in some instances the 1927 bulkhead stands in deep water. There
would be no point at this stage in reiterating the law as set forth in the previous
section of this article which clearly establishes the fact that the tidal lands on
navigable waters are sovereignty lands which are held by the State of Florida
for the use and benefit of the people of that state.
The upland owners have indicated that they propose to sustain their
position that the extended bulkheads and the construction thereon do not
constitute a purpresture and a nuisance, first, on the ground that they have
acquired the right to the exclusive use of the property by prescription through
long and continued use, second, on the ground that in each instance, before
the improvements were placed on the land, permits were procured from the
Secretary of War, and third, -that a decision of the court wherein the public
and the state would prevail would result in so great a pecuniary loss to the
private upland owners, not only in the Miami Beach area but in other areas
throughout the state where riparian owners are similarly situated, as to shock
the conscience.
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It has previously been shown herein that title as against the public cannot
be acquired by adverse possession,8 " or by prescription, that title in sovereignty
lands, being in the state held in trust for the use and benefit of the people of
the State of Florida, the statute of limitations cannot run against it.87 With regard to the argument that permits have been granted by the War Department
for construction over the submerged lands, it should be made clear that these
permits are really nothing more or less than an expert opinion on the part of
the United States Army Engineers to the effect that the planned construction
will not impede navigation. The Supreme Court of Florida, on the subject,
stated: "A permit from the Secretary of War amounts to no more than a certificate from that department that the proposed construction will not interfere
with navigation in interstate or foreign commerce. Thus it was held that a
permit by the Secretary of War for the construction of a tunnel tinder the
Hudson river merely expressed the assent of the Federal Government so far
as concerned public rights of navigation. Sullivan v. Booth, 210 App. Div. 347,
206 N.Y.S. 360. And a permit from such authority does not give the party to
whom it is issued the right to construct a wharf over submerged lands not owned
by him."
In the California Tideland case the question of the right of government
agencies. such as the War Department in this instance, to bind the United
States Government in the disposition of federal properties, was raised. The
Court stated: "And even assuming that Government agencies have been negligent in failing to recognize or assert the claims of the Government at an earlier
(late, the great interests of the Government in this ocean area are not to be forfeited as a result. The Government, which holds its interests here as elsewhere
in trust for all the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary
court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned
pieces of property; and officers who have no authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its
valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches. or failure to act." 89
Both the Supreme Court of the State of Florida and the Supreme Court
of the United States have had something to say with regard to the argument
that private interests stand to lose many millions of dollars in the event that
they fail to prevail in litigation of the character involved in the Plissner caseY"
In the case of Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co.0 ' the court held: "The
mere importance of the case does not affect the application of legal principles.
In determining these questions, grave and far reaching as they may be in their
86. Brickell v. Traminell, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So. 221 (1919).

87. Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28. 78 So. 491 (1917).
88.
89.
90.
91.

Pembroke v. Peninsular Terminal Co., 108 Fla. 46, 146 So. 249 (1933).
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
See note 83 supra.
108 Fla. 46. 146 So. 249 (1933).
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effect upon the titles to other properties, we must of course 'hew to the line'
of the law as we find it and understand it to be, as applied to the property and
the questions involved in this particular case, 'let the chips fall where they
may.' But in the decision of any particular case, the courts must be careful to
act in accordance with sound legal principles, so that the particular decision
will not only correctly define and apply the law to the particular case, but will
also furnish a safe and just precedent and guide to be followed in similar cases
which may arise in the future. There is food for thought, for courts as well as
individuals, in Kant's categorical imperative: 'Act on a maxim which thou
canst will to be law universal.' " Further, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the California Tideland case, stated: "We have not overlooked California's argument, buttressed by earnest briefs on behalf of other states, that
improvements have been made along and near the shores at great expense to
public and private agencies. And we note the Government's suggestion that
the aggregate value of all these inprovements is small in comparison with
the tremendous value of the entire three-mile belt here in controversy. But
however this may be, we are faced with the issue as to whether state or nation
has paramount rights in and power over this ocean belt, and that great national question is not dependent upon what expenses may have been incurred
upon mistaken assumptions." 92
The ruling in the California Tideland case makes it appear that the bulkhead extensions into the ocean, beyond the low water mark, constitute purprestures and encroachments upon the property of the United States.
The Supreme Court of Florida left no question with regard to the nature
and character of improvements over tidal and submerged sovereignty lands in
a reference to the common law, "any intrusion by the owner of the upland
upon the shore between high and low water mark was unlawful, and was
treated either as a purpresture or a nuisance." 03 Wrongful invasion, interference with or obstruction of, the rights of the public or the rights of a riparian
owner constitutes a nuisance and may be abated as such. 94
There can be no question but that the construction over the tidal and submerged lands on the ocean front by private interests for private use and benefit,
to the exclusion of the public generally, constitutes a violation and a breach of
the primary uses of bathing, recreation, fishing and navigation. 9 s
The court will certainly accept as common knowledge the fact that the
beaches at Miami Beach are regularly employed, throughout the year, by
thousands of people for bathing and recreational purposes. In one supreme
92.
93.
94.
(1909).
95.
174 So.

See note 89 supra.
Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1917).
Ferry Pass I. & S. Ass'n. v. White's River 1. & S. Ass'n., 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643
White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, 190 So. 446 (1939) ; Adams v. Elliott, 128 Fla, 79,
731 (1937); Sallas v. State, 98 Fla. 464, 124 So. 27 (1929).
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court case 96 it was stated: "The fact that Atlantic and Jacksonville Beaches
have been made public highways by legislative enactment in no way modifies or
restricts the use and right of the pedestrian public in the use of them for lawful purposes, and we think that right equal to, if not superior to, that of the
motorist. Bathing and recreation constitute the primary uses of most of our
beaches. It is common knowledge that during the summer season men, women
and children by the thousands flock to Atlantic and Jacksonville Beaches for
this purpose." In view of the millions of dollars involved it seems difficult to
believe that although a permit was sought from the War Department and
action was taken to secure permission through the city authorities in the City
of Miami Beach, no record appears anywhere of any application ever having
been made to any state authority for the right to create the improvements on
state property.
Mr. Justice Brown in the case of White v. Hughes 97 stated: "There is
probably no custom more universal, more natural or more ancient on the s':acoasts, not only of the United States, but of the world, than that of bathing in
the salt waters of the ocean and the enjoyment of the wholesome recreation incident thereto ....
The constant enjoyment of this privilege of thus using the
ocean and its fore-shore for ages without dispute should prove sufficient to establish it as an American common law right, similar to that of fishing in the
sea, even if this right had not come down to us as a part of the English common
law, which it undoubtedly has. See Brickell v. Trammel!, 77 Fla. 544, 82 So.
221. Private ownership stops at high-water mark. The State holds the foreshore in trust for its people for the purpose of navigation, fishing and bathing.
It is difficult indeed to imagine a general and public right of fishing in the sea,
and from the shore, unaccompanied by a general right to bathe there, and of
access thereto over the fore-shore for that purpose. Universal and habitual
practice in England for many years has established this right and it is also
recognized by a statute. . . . Small inland streams and lakes, which are not
navigable and not subject to the tides, may under certain circumstances become
private property to all intents and purposes. But not so the sea, or its shore."
In the same decision the Supreme Court of Florida succinctly stated the law of
the state as follows: "The beach of the Atlantic Ocean between high and lowwater marks is the property of the state, held in trust for the use of all the
people of the state."
CONCLUSION

The controversy over the title to and riparian rights in the beaches and
the ocean bottom at Miami Beach will serve to settle many important ques96. Sallas v. State, 98 Fla. 464. 124 So. 27 (1929).
97. White v. Hughes, 139 Fla. 54, t90'So. 446 (1939).
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tions of law. These questions will go to the Supreme Court of Florida for
final determination. It is conceivable, in view of the California Tideland
decision, that the Federal Government will eventtally become an interested
party to the cause or causes.
The law as it is established in this case will affect all ocean front land
in the state of Florida.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the pending litigation was brought by a
private citizen to abate a nuisance. The better procedure would have been by
a suit instituted by the Trustees of the Internal Iprovement Fund, as
plaintiffs, against all ocean front property owners in the state. There has been
an intimation that such a suit might eventually be brought in Leon County.
The boldness with which the City Council at Miami Beach has passed
ordinances and granted permits for the construction over what appears too
obviously to be public land is frightening. It is even more frightening to
observe that the city is affirmatively opposing the plaintiff in the pending litigation. In effect, it becomes the public versus the City of Miami Beach and
the riparian owners. The ill-advised municipal legislation may eventually lead
to expensive and serious consequences. The action of the city administration
amounts to approval of state land grants to private interests for private gain.
If an inland freeholder was authorized to extend his property lines to the
center line of a public street in order to give him available space to construct
a swimming pool and cabanas, the situation would be an analogous one. Where
the extension into a public street would amount to the grant of city property,
the extension of the bulkhead line amounts to a grant of state and perhaps
federal property.
If the riparian owners eventually prevail and are permitted to build out,
the beaches themselves, as we know them, throughout most of the city, will
be eliminated. In their place will arise formidable steel walls. Bathing in the
ocean itself will have to be accomplished by descendifig a set of steps leading
from the top of the wall to the water. Such steps have already been installed
wherever such construction has been completed.
Miami Beach depends upon tourists for its living. The ocean front is
studded with luxury hotels. However, there are thousands of accommodations
in off-the-ocean-front hotels, apartments and rooming houses. There are also
many tourists and retired people who dwell in residences throughout the city.
The greatest attraction that Miami Beach has been able to offer has unquestionably been the beach and the ocean. If the courts should hold that the
riparian owners could effectively bar all but those who dwell in the ocean front
properties, the economic collapse of the off-the-ocean-front properties seems
assured. If the courts are seriously influenced, on the one hand, by the millions
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of dollars invested by the riparian owners in construction over public land,
then the consciences of the courts will also have to be influenced, on the other
hand, by the millions of dollars invested in off-the-ocean-front properties.
The final decisions in this controversy will probably be more far reaching
in their effect upon real property in this state than any decisions previously
rendered.

